¹Zhao Xinlei,²Zhang JunHui

¹Ph.D. Candidate, School of International Studies/Academy of Overseas Chinese Studies, Jinan University (511436 Guang Zhou, Guang Dong Province, China).

²Postgraduate student, College of Life Science, Shanghai Normal University (201418 Shanghai,China)

Although it has been widely accepted in international relations discourse that Southeast Asian states generally adopt hedging strategies when faced with conflicts from external powers, however, this paper argues that when the intensity of confrontation and conflict between major powers exceeds the capacity threshold of small states, they tend to adopt either direct or ambiguous taking sides strategies in order to maintain their security by actively adhering to or being forced to follow a major power. According to Robert Putnam’s two-level games theory, leadership characteristics, capability threshold, state trust, structural pressure and system stability are the main factors that influence whether a small Southeast Asian country adopts a strategy of taking a side. Malaysia, for example, has adopted either direct or ambiguous taking sides strategies in response to the Sino-US conflict. By siding ambiguously with China or the US at different times, Malaysia has effectively consolidated its economic cooperation with major powers such as China and the US and gained actual economic benefits, reducing the risks and uncertainties posed to Malaysia by the great power game.

taking sides strategy, hedging strategy, big power conflict, small power response, two-level games theory, Malaysia

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VOLUME 06 ISSUE 04 APRIL 2023

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