¹Segun Ogunniyi OKEDIGBA Ph.D,
²Basirat Adefunke OLATAYO

¹Department of English, School of Languages,Oyo State College of Education, Lanlate.

²Department of Yoruba, School of Languages,Oyo State College of Education, Lanlate.

For about two decades now, Boko Haram, whose real name is “Jama`at ahl al-sunna li-da`wa wa-l-qital”, has been waging war against the Nigerian nation in a bid to carve an Islamic state (a caliphate) out of Nigeria. The group is opposed to any form of Western education as its name; Boko Haram, means “(Western) education is forbidden.” Pursuant to this, the deadly group has attacked schools where hundreds of students were kidnapped. Hundreds of people have also been killed by the group. However, the Nigerian government, through its well-oiled propaganda machine, is wont to make Nigerians believe that it is winning the war against Boko Haram. For example, the Nigerian government has, at one time or the other, said that Boko Haram had been “technically decimated” or “defeated several times.” The reality, however, is that the insurgents are the ones having the upper hand as they resurfaced (even with more viciousness and brutality) each time government claimed the group had been defeated. Therefore, this paper looks at how both the Nigerian government and the leadership of Boko Haram deploy language in the propaganda-driven Boko Haram war with the aim of exposing how effectively or otherwise the government of Nigeria and Boko Haram have employed language in dishing out propaganda to the public. It concludes that for the fight against the insurgents to be effective, the Nigerian government must show its readiness to fight crimes and criminality instead of relying on propaganda. Among others, the paper recommends that the Nigerian government should not take Boko Haram messages as “mere propaganda” because the insurgent group has on many occasions lived up to its threat.

Boko Haram, General Insecurity, Language, Nigeria, Propaganda

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Volume 05 Issue 06 June 2022

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